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Work on assessing Treasury’s forecasting performance to date has focussed on 
comparisons against consensus forecasts.  This study compares Treasury’s GDP and CPI 
forecast performance against individual private sector forecasters as well as major public 
sector institutions such as the IMF, OECD and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.  The 
head-to-head comparison makes it possible to assess Treasury’s forecasting performance 
relative to its peers.  When compared across all evaluation periods covering 1996-2005, 
Treasury’s GDP forecast performance was ranked in the middle at seventh out of 16.  The 
large forecast error for the 1998 year had a material impact on Treasury’s overall forecast 
performance.  Treasury’s CPI forecast performance was not as good, placing tenth out of 
12.  Large forecast errors for the 1998-2000 period accounted for the poor CPI forecast 
performance.  Treasury’s overall forecast performance was better when evaluating only 
the current year Budget forecasts, placing fourth for GDP and sixth for CPI.  This suggests 
that Treasury is better at forecasting the current year than the year ahead.  Consistent 
with international studies, no single forecaster consistently outperforms the Consensus, 
with Treasury beating the Mean 30% of the time for GDP and Consensus 33% of the time 
for CPI.  All forecasters find it difficult to pick recessions and turning points.  Large 
forecasting groups generally have a poorer forecasting record on average. 
   
JEL CLASSIFICATION  E27 - Forecasting and Simulation 
E37 - Forecasting and Simulation 
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Performance:  A Head-to-Head 
Comparison 
1 Introduction 
“…the ability to produce accurate predictions of the course of the economy in 
the near-term future is probably the main criterion by which the public judges 
the usefulness of our entire profession.”      Victor Zarnowitz (December 1986) 
The Treasury produces forecasts of the New Zealand economy at least twice a year which 
are published in the Economic and Fiscal Updates.
1
  The economic forecasts are used as 
a basis for Treasury’s economic and fiscal policy advice to the Government.  Consistently 
poor forecast performance can lead to policy mistakes, requiring disruptive policy 
adjustments further down the track.  Evaluating Treasury’s forecasting performance is 
therefore both important and necessary to ensure the quality of its advice.  In reality, there 
are many dimensions to consider when assessing the quality of economic and fiscal 
advice.  Zarnowitz’s statement above, however, provides a simple and high level 
benchmark for judging one of Treasury’s core functions. 
Treasury undertakes regular internal monitoring of its forecast performance, and since 
2003 its forecasting record has been publicly released on an annual basis.
2
  Work on 
comparing Treasury’s forecasting performance to date has mainly focussed on 
comparisons against consensus forecasts published by the New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research (NZIER).  International studies have found that consensus forecasts 
tend to perform better than forecasts produced by individual organisations (Batchelor, 
2001; Zarnowitz, 1984; Zarnowitz and Braun, 1992).  In this study, a different approach is 
taken.  Treasury’s forecast performance is compared with that of individual private sector 
forecasters as well as major public sector institutions, rather than simply with the average 
of other forecasts.  This makes it possible to assess how Treasury’s forecast performance 
compares with its peers, on average and also over time. 
Section 2 describes the data and methodology used in this paper.  Section 3 analyses the 
head-to-head comparison, and section 4 concludes. 
                                                                  
1  These are the Budget Economic and Fiscal Update (published at the time of the Budget, typically in May) and the Half Year 
Economic and Fiscal Update (published in November or December).  In addition, a Pre-election Economic and Fiscal Update is 
published four to six weeks before a general election. 
2   Go to http://www.treasury.govt.nz/forecasts/performance/ for the latest report.  
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2  Data and Methodology 
2.1 The  data 
Forecast data from private sector institutions come from Consensus Economics’ Asia 
Pacific edition of Consensus Forecasts.  Each month, Consensus Economics
3
 surveys a 
number of private sector institutions in New Zealand and collects their forecasts for 
several major economic variables – such as gross domestic product (GDP), private 
consumption, consumer price index (CPI), unemployment rate and the current account 
balance.  The forecasts are published in the second week of each month, based on the 
survey conducted in the previous two weeks.  Forecast data from major public sector 
institutions were sourced either directly from those institutions or from published 
forecasts.
4
   
As well as the forecasts of the individual participants in the survey, Consensus Economics 
also reports the mean of those forecasts (known as the consensus forecast).  In this 
study, two alternative ‘consensus’ measures are calculated for each period.  One is a 
Mean of the private sector institutions used in this study, plus the Reserve Bank, OECD 
and IMF.  The other is the Median of the forecasts used in the study, calculated to reduce 
the influence of extreme forecasts.  The Mean and Median are calculated only for GDP, 
since the CPI forecasts used in this study are not on a comparable basis.
5
 
A common dilemma in the forecasting literature is the appropriate “actual outturn” data to 
use for assessing forecast accuracy.  Unlike the CPI, which is generally not subject to 
revision, initial GDP outturns are often subject to numerous revisions.  The revisions could 
be due to updated information, methodological changes, the introduction of new weights 
or rebasing (see table 1).  Since forecasts made at any point in time are based on all 
available data at the time (and methodology), and are often judged against the first 
available data outturn, this study uses the initial outturn as the basis for assessing 
forecast accuracy. 
Table 1 – Initial and latest GDP outturn (1996 to 2005)  
Calendar year Initial outturn Latest outturn %-point difference
1996 2.7 4.1 1.4
1997 2.3 1.9 -0.4
1998 -0.3 -0.1 0.2
1999 3.4 4.4 1.0
2000 3.5 3.4 -0.1
2001 2.4 3.0 0.6
2002 4.4 4.8 0.4
2003 3.5 3.4 -0.1
2004 4.8 4.4 -0.4
2005 2.2 2.2 0.0
High 1.4
Low -0.4
Mean 0.3  
                                                                  
3  For more information on Consensus Economics, visit their website at www.consensuseconomics.com. 
4  The Reserve Bank provided their forecast data for this study.  The OECD’s forecasts were sourced from their twice yearly Economic 
Outlook publication.   The IMF’s forecasts were sourced from their World Economic Outlook reports. 
5  Some institutions forecast a different measure of consumer price inflation for part of the evaluation period.  See page 4 below.  
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2.2 The  methodology 
To ensure adequate comparisons, only the Consensus Forecasts which were surveyed in 
the same month that Treasury’s forecasts were finalised were used, thereby ensuring that 
the forecasts were based on similar information sets.  These are typically the April/May 
and October/November editions of Consensus Forecasts.  Private sector forecasters that 
are no longer featured in Consensus Forecasts, either because they are no longer 
included or because they have been merged or taken over by another forecaster, and 
those without a sufficient number of observations, have been excluded.  The Reserve 
Bank’s forecasts were based on their Monetary Policy Statements which were finalised in 
the month closest to when the Treasury finalised.  The OECD’s Economic Outlook is 
normally published in June and December, while the IMF’s World Economic Outlook is 
normally published in May and October.  The minor timing differences of when the 
different forecasts were finalised can have an impact on the forecast performance, given 
sudden exchange rate or commodity price changes.  It is difficult to quantify or resolve the 
timing differences, and they are an important and ongoing issue for forecast comparisons.   
The forecast performance of the individual forecasters is not disclosed in this study.  They 
are labelled as either Forecaster X, or Forecasting Group Y.  Table 2 below lists the 
forecasters covered in this study. 





First NZ Capital NZIER
UBS OECD
Westpac Reserve Bank  
Due to the limited availability of consistent forecast data, the comparison focuses only on 
“current year” and “year ahead” forecasts of GDP and CPI, on a calendar year basis (ie 
for the year ended December) covering the evaluation period 1996 to 2005.
6
  A current 
year forecast is defined as one that is made within the calendar year that the forecast 
period relates to, and a year ahead forecast is one where the forecast is made in the 
calendar year prior.  For example, a forecast made in April 2004 for the 2004 calendar 
year is a “current year forecast” and the forecast for the 2005 calendar year is a “year 
ahead forecast”.  Table 3 shows the number of observations and forecasters that are 
included in this study.  Note that the number of forecasters includes the Consensus, Mean 
and Median calculations.   
Table 3 – Number of observations and forecasters 
Current year Year ahead Current year Year ahead
GDP 308 312 16 16
CPI 227 231 12 12
Number of observations Number of forecasters
 
Forecasts for GDP are all in annual average percent change terms and are comparable 
across all forecasters except for the OECD, which forecasts on an expenditure GDP 
                                                                  
6  The implied forecasting horizons are typically 2, 8, 14 and 20 months ahead.  
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basis, not production GDP.  The forecasts for CPI are not all on a comparable basis.  Data 
from the Consensus Forecasts are for headline CPI in annual average percent change 
terms, except for a brief period in 1999 and 2000 when it was for CPIX.
7
  Reserve Bank 
and Treasury forecasts are for annual percent change of CPIX for the reference years 
1996 to 2000, and annual percent change of headline CPI thereafter.  In all instances, the 
appropriate actual outturn was used to calculate the forecast error. 
The method used to compare forecast performance is similar to the one used by Blix et al 
(2001).  It is based on an average relative rank over all the evaluation periods.  For each 
organisation’s GDP and CPI forecast for an evaluation period, a relative rank is assigned 
based on the mean absolute error.  The most accurate (ie, having the lowest mean 
absolute error) is given a ranking of 1, the next given a ranking of 2 and so on.  An 
average relative rank is then calculated for each organisation over the entire evaluation 
period.  The average relative rank itself is then ranked to allow for easier comparison.  
This metric does not put any weightings on good or poor forecasts.  For example, two 
forecasters will have similar rankings if one had two fourth placings and a first, while 
another had three third placings (both will have average relative rankings of 3).   
Another metric which places weightings for poor forecast performance is the root mean 
squared error (RMSE).  The RMSE for each forecaster is calculated over all evaluation 
periods, and ranked.  The rankings obtained from the average relative rank based on the 
mean absolute error can differ, in some cases quite substantially, from that obtained by 
ranking the RMSE because the latter penalises large forecast errors more severely.  Due 
to the relatively limited sample period, this study focuses more on the average relative 
rank metric as it does not penalise a forecaster as much for large forecast errors.  
3 Head-to-Head  Comparison 
3.1  Forecast performance across all evaluation periods 
Figure 1 presents the average relative rank (based on mean absolute error) for each 
forecaster’s GDP and CPI forecasts across all evaluation periods (April/May and 
October/November current year and year ahead forecasts for the periods 1996 to 2005).  
The best forecast performances are those in the lower left of Figure 1 showing the lowest 
average relative ranks, while the worst forecast performances are in the upper right.  Of 
the 12 forecasters who forecast both GDP and CPI, the best was the Consensus.  The 
Treasury is among the worst performers for CPI forecasts.  Figure 2 presents the RMSE 
of each forecaster’s GDP and CPI forecasts across all evaluation periods.  On the RMSE 
measure, Treasury’s forecast performance is amongst the poorest for both GDP and CPI. 
Table 4 presents the average relative rank and RMSE for each forecaster across all 
evaluation periods.  For GDP on an average relative rank basis, the Mean was the most 
accurate followed by the Median, with the Consensus taking third place.  Treasury came 
in close to the middle of the pack at seventh placing out of 16.  Treasury came in 13
th 
based on the RMSE.  The difference in ranking based on the average relative rank and 
RMSE highlights how large forecast errors can affect forecast performance.  Treasury’s 
large forecast error for the 1998 period (see Appendix Figure 8) had quite a material 
                                                                  
7 CPIX is the Consumers Price Index excluding credit services and interest charges.  It was the target measure of inflation for the 
Reserve Bank until September 1999 when interest charges (but not other credit services) were removed from the CPI.  
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impact on the overall RMSE, which made their RMSE ranking worse than the average 
relative rank.  Treasury forecasters at that time misjudged the impact of the Asian financial 
crisis and droughts on economic activity, revising their forecasts much later than other 
forecasters.  The Mean, which had the best ranking based on the average relative rank, 
came in only at fifth place when ranked according to the RMSE.  Across all forecasters, 
the average relative rank and the RMSE usually produce similar rankings but the 
exceptions to this are Treasury and Forecasting Group 3.  For Treasury, the large forecast 
error in 1998 worsened its RMSE ranking.  For Forecasting Group 3, making conservative 
forecasts ensured that it was not penalised for large forecast errors, but it also means that 
it is less successful at getting the closest to the actual number. 
Large forecasting groups, on average, tend to perform poorly at forecasting GDP 
compared to private sector forecasters on the average relative rank basis.  But their 
performance is comparable on the RMSE ranking.  This suggests that forecasting groups 
tend to be more conservative in their forecasts, which may not result in a closer forecast 
to the actual, but lessens the chance of a large forecast error.   








4 . 04 . 55 . 05 . 56 . 06 . 57 . 07 . 5 CPI
GDP
Forecaster 1 Forecaster 2 Forecaster 3 Forecaster 4
Forecaster 5 Forecaster 6 Forecasting Group 1 Forecasting Group 2
















0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 CPI
GDP
Forecaster 1 Forecaster 2 Forecaster 3 Forecaster 4
Forecaster 5 Forecaster 6 Forecasting Group 1 Forecasting Group 2
Forecasting Group 3 Forecasting Group 6 Treasury Consensus  
Table 4 – Average RMSE and relative rank across all evaluation periods 
Ave. Rel. Rank Rank RMSE Rank Ave. Rel. Rank Rank RMSE Rank
Forecaster 1 9.1 15 1.38 10 6.0 8 0.65 5
Forecaster 2 6.4 4 1.27 6 5.4 5 0.66 6
Forecaster 3 8.1 11 1.41 14 4.9 3 0.61 2
Forecaster 4 7.3 8 1.30 7 5.5 6 0.82 12
Forecaster 5 6.9 5 1.37 9 5.2 4 0.68 7
Forecaster 6 7.7 10 1.31 8 4.6 2 0.64 4
Forecasting Group 1 8.8 13 1.44 15 7.0 12 0.82 11
Forecasting Group 2 9.8 16 1.55 16 6.2 9 0.73 9
Forecasting Group 3 7.3 9 1.10 1 5.8 7 0.62 3
Forecasting Group 4 8.8 14 1.39 12 .. .. .. ..
Forecasting Group 5 8.7 12 1.39 11 .. .. .. ..
Forecasting Group 6 7.1 6 1.23 2 6.3 11 0.71 8
Treasury 7.3 7 1.41 13 6.3 10 0.79 10
Consensus 6.2 3 1.26 4 4.5 1 0.59 1
Median (ex Treasury) 5.7 2 1.25 3 .. .. .. ..
Mean (ex Treasury) 5.5 1 1.3 5 .. .. .. ..
Average 1.33 0.69
Number of forecasters 16 12
GDP CPI
 
For CPI, the Consensus performed the best on both the average relative rank and RMSE 
basis.  Treasury came in 10
th out of 12 on both bases.  Large forecast errors for CPI 
relating to the 1998-2000 period (see Appendix Figure 9) were a large contributor to the 
poor forecast performance.  Overestimating GDP growth for 1998 also led to an 
overestimation of CPI for the 1998 and 1999 years.  In 2000, Treasury underestimated 
CPI due to the pass-through from the exchange rate depreciation at that time.    
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3.2  Forecast performance for Budget current year 
Another useful evaluation of Treasury’s relative forecast performance is to focus on the 
current year Budget forecasts, since getting an accurate picture of the current economic 
outlook is a critical input for Budget decision-making and fiscal strategy.  Figure 3 
presents the average relative rank and Figure 4 presents the RMSE for each forecaster’s 
GDP and CPI current year forecasts made in April/May to coincide with when Treasury 
typically finalises its Budget forecasts.  Once again, the Consensus performed well on 
both measures and was in the lower left areas of Figures 3 and 4.  Treasury’s forecast 
performance showed an improvement on both GDP and CPI for current year only 
forecasts. 
Table 5 presents the average relative rank and RMSE for each forecaster.  The Mean 
once again had the best performance for GDP on an average relative rank basis, with the 
Consensus coming in second.  Treasury’s ranking improved to fourth placing on the 
average relative rank basis, but came in second on the RMSE measure.  Major 
forecasting groups again were outperformed by private sector forecasters on the average 
relative rank basis, but are comparable on the RMSE measure.  For CPI, Treasury was 
sixth on the average relative rank basis and ninth on the RMSE basis, better than the 10
th 
placing when evaluated across all periods.   









4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 CPI
GDP
Forecaster 1 Forecaster 2 Forecaster 3 Forecaster 4
Forecaster 5 Forecaster 6 Forecasting Group 1 Forecasting Group 2
Forecasting Group 3 Forecasting Group 6 Treasury Consensus   
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0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 CPI
GDP
Forecaster 1 Forecaster 2 Forecaster 3 Forecaster 4
Forecaster 5 Forecaster 6 Forecasting Group 1 Forecasting Group 2
Forecasting Group 3 Forecasting Group 6 Treasury Consensus  
Table 5 – Average RMSE and relative rank for Budget current year forecast 
Ave. Rel. Rank Rank RMSE Rank Ave. Rel. Rank Rank RMSE Rank
Forecaster 1 11.3 16 1.39 13 5.3 5 0.56 3
Forecaster 2 7.9 9 1.32 9 7.0 10 0.72 10
Forecaster 3 8.3 11 1.31 8 5.1 4 0.41 1
Forecaster 4 6.9 8 1.30 6 5.1 3 0.72 8
Forecaster 5 5.7 5 1.36 11 6.4 9 0.59 4
Forecaster 6 5.3 3 1.36 12 4.1 1 0.68 6
Forecasting Group 1 9.7 15 1.39 14 7.1 11 0.73 11
Forecasting Group 2 8.0 10 1.33 10 7.6 12 0.85 12
Forecasting Group 3 9.5 14 1.30 7 6.2 8 0.65 5
Forecasting Group 4 9.2 13 1.41 16 .. .. .. ..
Forecasting Group 5 9.0 12 1.41 15 .. .. .. ..
Forecasting Group 6 6.8 7 1.19 1 5.9 7 0.68 7
Treasury 5.6 4 1.19 2 5.7 6 0.72 9
Consensus 5.1 2 1.23 3 4.5 2 0.55 2
Median (ex Treasury) 6.0 6 1.29 5 .. .. .. ..
Mean (ex Treasury) 4.7 1 1.25 4 .. .. .. ..
Average 1.31 0.65
Number of forecasters 16 12
GDP CPI
 
The improvement in Treasury’s forecast performance for the Budget current year 
compared to all forecast horizons indicates that Treasury is better at current year 
forecasts, and underperforms for year ahead forecasts.  In the case of GDP, there was a 
large improvement in forecast performance from seventh to fourth on the average relative 
rank, and 13
th placing to second on the RMSE measure.  The big improvement on the 
RMSE measure was due to the exclusion of the large forecast errors in the year ahead  
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forecasts relating to the 1998 recession.  Treasury’s CPI forecast performance also 
improved but remains in the middle (sixth out of 12) or the bottom half of all forecasters.   
3.3  No one consistently outperforms the Consensus 
Similar to the findings of the international studies cited in the introduction, no individual 
forecaster in New Zealand consistently outperforms the Consensus (or the Mean) for both 
GDP and CPI.  Forecaster 5 had the highest percentage of out-performance for GDP 
beating the Mean 44% of the time, yet only placed fifth overall on the average relative 
rank basis.  For CPI, Forecaster 6 had a higher rate of out-performance beating the 
Consensus 47% of the time, putting it in second place overall on the average relative rank 
basis.  Forecasting Group 2, the worst performer for GDP forecasts, only managed to beat 
the Mean 18% of the time.  Forecasting Group 1, which had the worst performance for 
CPI forecasts, beat the Consensus 23% of the time.  Treasury managed to beat the Mean 
30% of the time for GDP, and Consensus 33% of the time for CPI. 



























Top 3 placing Middle Bottom 3 placing
 
Figures 5 and 6 present the frequency of each forecaster’s relative ranking over all 
evaluation periods based on either a top 3, middle or bottom 3 placing.  Despite the Mean 
having the best overall performance for GDP, three other forecasters had more top 3 
placings.  Because the Mean helps smooth out the extreme forecasts, it provides a more 
reliable and stable forecast performance which is the main reason for its overall top  
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position.  Forecasting Group 5 had the most top 3 placings for GDP, yet placed 12
th on the 
average relative rank and 11
th on the RMSE basis. 
For CPI, Forecaster 4 had the highest number of top 3 placings, even though they came 
in sixth overall based on the average relative rank.  The Consensus had the best overall 
performance even though over half of the individual forecasters had more top 3 placings.  
This highlights the importance of consistency in forecast performance. 
Treasury had a top 3 placing 11 times out of 40 for GDP forecasts, and 14 times for CPI 
forecasts.  Treasury’s overall forecast performance for CPI was dragged down by a high 
frequency of bottom 3 placings (10 times).  





















Top 3 placing Middle Bottom 3 placing
 
3.4  Forecasting turning points is difficult 
Despite the importance of being able to predict turning points and in particular recessions 
at an early stage, overseas studies find that the ability of forecasters to predict recessions 
is poor.  For example, Loungani (2001) evaluated the performance of Consensus 
Forecasts of real GDP growth for a large number of industrialised and developing 
countries for the time period 1989 to 1998 (calendar years).  Only two of the 60 episodes 
of recessions (defined as any calendar year in which real GDP declined) that occurred 
over the sample were predicted a year in advance, two-thirds remained undetected by 
April of the year in which the recession occurred, and in about a quarter of the cases the  
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forecast in October was still for positive growth (albeit small).  Loungani notes that the 
predictive failure could arise either because forecasters lack the requisite information (in 
terms of reliable real-time data or reliable models) or because they lack the incentives to 
predict recessions.   
The only recession period in this study was 1998, and consistent with Loungani’s finding, 
none of the individual forecasters picked the recession even only a few months out.   
Figure 7 presents the GDP forecast revisions for calendar 1998.  Even by April of that 
year, most forecasters were expecting reasonable growth with a range of 1.6% - 3.5%, 
with the Consensus at 2.3%.  Treasury at that stage was forecasting growth of 2.4%, 
close to the Consensus but a large downward revision from the previous forecast of 3.9%.  
Although subsequent forecasts were revised downwards, it was not until October of that 
year that most forecasters were predicting a recession.  In fact, by August, only 2 of the 
forecasters covered by the Consensus Forecasts were picking a recession.  Treasury at 
that stage, in a one-off forecast update in August, had revised down its forecast to -0.5%.  
In the September edition of Consensus Forecasts, almost half of the 13 forecasters 
surveyed were predicting a recession, but the Consensus remained positive at 0.3%.   








Jan-97 Apr-97 Jul-97 Oct-97 Jan-98 Apr-98 Jul-98 Oct-98
Consensus Treasury
Annual average % change
 
Forecasters find it equally difficult to predict the peak of the economic cycle.  The peak of 
GDP growth over the evaluation period was in 2004 at 4.8%.  Twenty months out, the 
range of forecasts was 2.1% - 3.6%, with the Consensus at 2.7%.  Fourteen months out, 
the forecast range was actually revised downwards to 1.9% - 3.2%, although the 
Consensus remained at 2.7%.  By April 2004, the Consensus was revised up to 3%, but 
the forecast range of 2.5% - 3.6% still did not encompass the actual outturn.  It was not 
until July that the forecast range included the actual outturn.  
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This study extends Treasury’s current forecast accuracy work by making direct 
comparisons of Treasury’s forecast performance against other forecasters.  When 
compared across all evaluation periods (calendar years 1996-2005), Treasury’s GDP 
forecast performance was ranked in the middle at seventh place out of 16 on the average 
relative rank basis.  Treasury forecasters misjudged the impact of the Asian financial crisis 
and droughts on economic activity in 1998, resulting in large forecast errors at that time 
which had a material impact on Treasury’s overall forecast performance.  This is reflected 
in a relatively large RMSE compared to other forecasters.  When compared only against 
other individual forecasters across all evaluation periods (ie, excluding Consensus, 
Median and Mean), Treasury’s GDP forecast performance is in the top half, and better 
than other major forecasting groups.  However, Treasury’s CPI forecast performance 
ranks in the bottom half, out-performing only two other forecasting groups.  Large forecast 
errors for CPI relating to the 1998-2000 period were a large contributor to the poor 
forecast performance.   
Treasury’s forecast performance was better when evaluating only the current year Budget 
forecasts, placing fourth for GDP and sixth for CPI.  This suggests that Treasury is better 
at forecasting the current year than the year ahead.  Compared to other individual 
forecasters, Treasury’s Budget current year GDP forecast was bettered only by one other 
forecaster. 
Consistent with international studies, no single forecaster consistently outperforms the 
Consensus, and all forecasters find it difficult to pick recessions and turning points.  Large 
forecasting groups, on average, tend to perform poorly at forecasting GDP compared to 
private sector forecasters on the average relative rank basis.  This finding is similar to Blix 
et al (2001).  But their performance is comparable on the RMSE ranking, suggesting that 
forecasting groups tend to be more conservative in their forecasts, which may not result in 
a closer forecast to the actual, but lessens the chance of a large forecast error.  Another 
possible explanation is that major forecasting groups tend to produce comprehensive 
forecasts at certain times during the year, which do not coincide with the dates chosen for 
this study.  Their responses to Consensus Economics could therefore be quick updates 
which reduce their forecast performance.  It is difficult to quantify and resolve this timing 
issue which may affect forecasting performance as measured in this comparison.  
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